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CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
None are applicable.
JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal pursuant to §78-2a-3(2)(j) (1953, as
amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court properly grant Ivory North's Motion for Summary Judgment

based on Fennel's failure to dispute the relevant facts set forth in Ivory North's Motion for
Summary Judgment?

In examining the trial court's order granting summary judgment, the

appeals court determines only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law and
whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material fact. Otsuka
Electronics (USA, Inc., v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937 P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
The Appellate Court may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the
trial court, even if it is one not relied upon by the trial court. Id.
2.

Did the trial court properly conclude that Ivory North did not have any knowledge

of any geological condition on the subject property, the Maughan report or evaluation of the
subject property, or the possibility of the subject property being the site of potential landslides?
A "genuine" issue of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment exists only if the non-moving
party provides evidence which is "sufficiently probative" that "a reasonable jury could return a
1

verdict for the non-moving party " Anderson v Liberty Lobby Inc , 477 U S 242, 248 (1986)
More specifically, in Celotex Corp v Catrett, Ml U S 317 (1986), the Supreme Court clarified
that a party seeking to avoid summary judgment must demonstrate genuine issues of material
fact with respect to each essential element of its case as to which it bears the burden of proof at
trial

Id

Conclusory allegations will not establish issues of fact sufficient to defeat summary

judgment McVayv Western Plains Service Corp , 823 F 2d 1395 (10th Cir 1987)
3.

Should the Appellate Court deny Fennel's Appeal because it does not comply

with Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure9 "If a party fails to make a concise statement
of the facts and citation of the pages in the record where those facts are supported, the court will
assume the correctness of the judgment below " Kouhs v Standard Oil Co of California, 1A6
P 2d 1182, 1184 (Utah Ct App 1987)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
In the Spring of 1995, Fennell contacted Ivory North regarding constructing a new home

based upon the Ivory Homes Newport model Fennell, however, did not approve of any of the
available lots then owned by Ivory North Consequently, Fennell and Ivoi y North investigated
various lots in the Layton area, eventually finding a lot in the Falcon Ridge subdivision
On or about May 18, 1995, Plaintiff and Ivory North entered into a Real Estate Purchase
Agreement for the purchase of a home built on Lot 31 of Falcon Ridge loc ated in the city of

2

Layton, Utah. Ivory North then constructed the home, which was inspected and approved by
Fennell. On or about December 22, 1995, Fennell moved into the home.
On or about April 14, 1998, Fennell alleges that a landslide occurred on the property. No
one was injured as a result of the landslide, nor was any other property damaged or destroyed.
On or about April 7, 2000, Fennell filed a Complaint. In particular, Fennel alleged that part of
the area of the land subdivided as Falcon Ridge Phase 2, including Lot 31, was subject to
landslides and erosion, that the fact that the land is subject to landslides and erosion was known
or should have been known to Ivory North, as a professional subdivider, developer, seller, and
builder.
B.

The Course of Proceedings
On October 25, 2001, Ivory North's motion for summary judgment came on regularly for

hearing. The Court after reviewing the submitted memorandum and hearing oral arguments
granted Ivory North's motion for summary judgment on all causes of action. Generally, the
Court held that Fennel failed to properly dispute the relevant facts set forth in Ivory North's
Motion, and therefore, Ivory North's Statement of Undisputed Facts were deemed admitted due
to the lack of response. Specifically, the Court held that it was undisputed that Ivory North did
not have any knowledge of any geological condition on the subject property, had no knowledge
of the report and evaluation of the property prepared by Glenn Maughan, and had no knowledge
of the possibility of the subject property being the site of potential landslides.

3

C.

Facts Relevant to the Issues on Appeal
1.

In the spring of 1995, Fennell contacted Ivory North regarding constructing a new

home based upon Ivory Newport model. See Deposition Transcript of Jamies Fennell at R.351.
2.

Fennell and Ivory North investigated various lots in the Layton area, eventually

finding the lot in the Falcon Ridge subdivision. See Deposition Transcript of James Fennell at
R.351, and Affidavit of Karen Galloway at R.354.
3.

Ivory North did not encourage Fennell to select the lot in the Falcon Ridge

subdivision. See Deposition Transcript of James Fennell at R.351 and Affidavit of Karen
Galloway at R.354.
4.

Ivory North has no interest in the Falcon Ridge subdivision, did not own the lot

selected by Fennell, and did not participate in any manner in the subdividing of Falcon Ridge.
See Affidavit of Karen Galloway at R.354.
5.

Ivory North had no knowledge regarding any geological conditions or alleged

problems with soil on the subject property or the Falcon Crest subdivision. See Affidavit of
Karen Galloway at R.354.
6.

On or about May 18, 1995, Fennell and Ivory North entered into a Real Estate

Purchase Agreement ("Agreement") for the purchase of a home built on Lot 31 of Falcon Ridge
located in the city of Layton, Court of Davis. See Real Estate Purchase Agreement at R.357.
7.

Section 3.7 of the Agreement states:
IVORY HOME WARRANTY. At or after CLOSING, SELLER
shall provide BUYER with a home buyers warranty (the" IVORY
4

HOME WARRANTY") from SELLER (or in SELLER'S sole
discretion, a third party providing such warranties) that covers the
HOUSE and that contains terms and conditions then being
provided by SELLER. The construction quality standards that
are set forth in the IVORY HOME WARRANTY shall be the
sole and exclusive standards applicable to the HOUSE.
(Emphasis added).
See Real Estate Purchase Agreement at R.360.
8.

Section 3.8 of the agreement states:
EXCLUSION OF OTHER WARRANTIES. Except for the
IVORY HOME WARRANTY and SELLER'S obligation to repair
or replace WALK-THROUGH ITEMS" (a) SELLER conveys the
PROPERTY to BUYER, "AS IS, WHERE IS," WITHOUT
REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE, HABIT ABILITY OR WORKMANSHIP: (b)
SELLER makes no representations or warranties to BUYER that
any particular view exists or shall continue to exist from the
PROPERTY or regarding the environmental condition of the
PROPERTY (including the presence or freedom from radon,
hazardous waste or hazardous materials); (c) SELLER expressly
disclaims any other representations or warranties regarding the
PROPERTY; (d) BUYER accepts the PROPERTY in the condition
in which the PROPERTY exists on the CLOSING DATE; and (e)
BUYER releases SELLER from any liability for the PROPERTY
under federal or state environmental laws, including, but not
limited to , claims under CRCLA and RCRA.

See Real Estate Purchase Agreement at R.360.
9.

Section 7.7 of the Agreement states:
ENTIRE AGREEMENT.
BUYER hereby represents to SELLER that BUYER is not relying
upon any warranties, promises, guarantees or representations made
5

by SELLER, by one acting or claiming to act on behalf of SELLER
or by a SELLER AFFILIATE, unless the same is reduced to writing
and is made a part of this AGREEMENT. This AGREEMENT and
the documents that are specifically referred to herein constitute the
entire agreement and understanding between BUYER and SELLER
with respect to BUYER'S purchase of the PROPERTY and cannot be
amended, changed, modified or supplemented except by an instrument
in writing signed by both parties, but no such modification needs
consideration to be binding. This AGREEMENT supersedes all prior
agreements, correspondence, memoranda, representations and
understandings of the parties relating to the PROPERTY, whether oral
or written. No representations have been made to induce the parties
hereto to enter into this AGREEMENT except as are set forth herein.
Any agreements, representations, covenants and warranties on the part
of either party hereto that are contained in this AGREEMENT and any
amendment and supplement hereto shall survive the CLOSING and
deliveries of documents and instruments hereunder and shall not be
merged into such documents and instruments.
See Real Estate Purchase Agreement at R.361.
10.

Plaintiff acknowledged signing and entering into the subject Agreement with

Ivory North. See Deposition Transcript of James Fennell at R.352.
11. On or about December 22, 1995, Plaintiff signed the Ivory Home Warranty, Warranty
Certificate which indicates that Plaintiff received the Ivory Homes Express Limited Warranty.
See Deposition Transcript of James Fennell at R.352 and Ivory Home Warranty, Warranty
Certificate, R.371.
12.

The Warranty Certificate states in Section 7 that "[T]he Homebuyer understand,

and by signing this form do hereby acknowledge, that the warranty is an EXPRESS LIMITED
WARRANTY and that no person or entity shall have any liability whatsoever, by implication or
otherwise, for claims which are not EXPRESSLY covered by the General Provisions and
6

Warranty Standards. N O CONSEQUEN I IAI • D AA fAGES t \ R E CO V ER ED B \ I I IIS
WARRANTY. Sec Ivory Home Warrant). W arrantx Certificate, R.371.

1,7, EXCI I IS10NS
Buiilldei Is i lot i espoi isible foi :
1.7!

1 >eiects not resulting in actual physical damage or loss. . . .
. -.;.

.a,iiuar\ walls, retaining walls, and bulkheads

1.7.11 l.i »^ oi use, loss of opportunity, lovi wl in.iiki'l < .line !nv, <
or any other consequential loss.

i,nl ,ih ie

1.7.16. Loss or damage externally caused, including, but not limited to; acts of
G o d , . . . mud slides,. . . abuse or use of the Home, or any part thereof, beyond
the reasonable capacity of such part for such use, or by any other external cause
1.7.18. Loss or damage resulting from or made worse by subsidence or soil
movement.
See Ivory Homes Express Warranty at R.377-78
14.

Ivory Noi th constructcvi \\K iiuiiu n^aiuJ on I ot ^1 of Falcon Ridge which was

inspected and approved by Fennell. See R.4-5.
15

• ;; *or; 11 conveyed title to the subject property to Fennell by deed dated

December 22, 1995, and Fennell moved into the hon ie Sc •« " R 1 5.
16.

Fennell alleges that on April 14, 1998, a landslide occurred on the back portion of

the lot See R 5.
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17.

No one was physically injured as a result of the landslide, nor was any other

property damaged or destroyed. See R.783.
18.

On or about April 7, 2000, Fennell filed a Complaint. See R.2-11.

19.

Green and Wall did not disclose to potential purchasers of Lot 31 the geologist

reports and geological hazards of Lot 31 on the Subdivision Plat. R.1348.
20.

Defendant Green and Wall did not disclose to potential purchasers of Lot 31,

including Ivory North, the geologist reports and geological hazards of Lot 31 in the protective
covenants. R.1348.
21.

Defendant Green and Wall did not disclose the geological hazards of Lot 31 in the

contract of sale to Ivory North. R. 1348.
22.

Defendant Green and Wall did not disclose the geological hazards of Lot 31 in the

deed of conveyance to Ivory North. R. 1348.
23.

On or about May 17, 2001, Ivory North filed its Motion for Summary Judgment.

See R.330.
24.

On October 25, 2001, the trial court heard Ivory North's Motion for Summary

Judgment. At the hearing, Fennell waived his claim for breach of implied warranty. See, R.1705
at pp. 76-77.
25.

The Court after reviewing the submitted memorandum and hearing oral

arguments granted Ivory North's motion for summary judgment on all causes of action.
Generally, the Court held that Fennel failed to properly dispute the relevant facts set forth in
8

Ivory N o r t h ' s motion mid 'llinvlnn/,, Ivors Mnrlli"1-, Slatetiietil ofI 'ndisputed I .kt'. weie deemed
admitted due to tiu .ack of response. See R. I 70S at 92 Specifically, the Court held that n w a s
5

T

. Oi-

v L . o - _\_ai ^ ,;.;it;oi. t ;. ;ue

subject property had no knowledge of the repot i ami e\aluaiion of dhe property prepared by
i L .a:

.1. M\icagcoi ilic posNiniiii'- -; i.ne subject property being the site of

potential landslides. See R.1705 at 92-94.
S U M M A R Y OF A R G U M E N T
1.

I he trial court proper!\ jn'anlrd f\on Nnnh's Molimi loi

Iiidgrnuiif

NIIMIIIUM

based on Fennel's failure to comply with Rule 4-501(2)(B), I Itah Rules of Judicial
\ dn iii listratioi i 1 \ 1 ii ::1 11 eqi iir "s a pai t> coi itestii ig a N lotioi i fc -\ Si n i n nary Judgment to include a
section that contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's statement of facts as to
1

. Ik I. ilie \\\\\\ u iihiids a genuine issue exists . a l o s w d by a concise statement of material facts

which support the party's contention. In the instant case, in his memoranu;

>pp*

Fennel; .; Motion lor Nummary Judgment, Fennel did not dispute any of Ivory North's statements
of undisputed facts. Thus the trial court's enti y • :>f si n nmai > ji idgmei it ii i favoi :>f h > oi ] "' 1 k Jon th
was proper and should be upheld,
2.

'1 h* *

*

..•

\

. \ ledge

of any geological condition on the subject property, the Maughan report or evaluation of the
• ? • = .•. -

. •'•"

.

<-pji:> oeing the site of potential landslides. It

is undisputed that Ivory North did not have any knowledge of any alleged geological rr -hi.- 9

with the subject property, that Ivory North was never provided with a copy of the Maughan
report, or advised of any alleged problems with the subject property. Accordingly, the trial
court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Ivory North should be affirmed.
3.

The Appellate Court should deny Fennell's appeal because it does not comply

with Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In particular, Fennell's brief does not include
a coherent statement of the issues presented for appeal nor in the statement of facts relevant to
the issues on appeal include a single proper cite to the record. Consequently, the Appellate Court
should reject Fennell's appeal and assume the correctness of the trial court' entry of summary
judgment in favor of Ivory North.
ARGUMENT
L

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY GRANTED IVORY NORTH'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ON FENNEL'S FAILURE TO DISPUTE
THE RELEVANT FACTS SET FORTH IN IVORY NORTH'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 4-501 (2)(b) states:
Memorandum in opposition to a motion. The points and authorities
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment shall begin with a
section that contains a verbatim restatement of each of the movant's
statement of facts as to which the party contends a genuine issue exists
followed by a concise statement of material facts which support the
party's contention. Each disputed fact shall be stated in separate
numbered sentences and shall specifically refer to those portions of
the record upon which the opposing party relies. All material facts
set forth in the movant's statement and properly supported by an
accurate reference to the record shall be deemed admitted for the
purpose of summary judgment unless specifically controverted by
the opposing party's statement.
10

Id. (emphasis added).
Fenneli contends on appeal that the trial court abrogated it^ duties b> LM anting Mimr..ary

Administration. Ilowever, the language of Rule 4-501 (2)(B), Rules of Judicial Administration,
slakabh \no\ ink s iluil unless specifically controverted, all material facts set forth in Ivory
North's statement and supported by an accurate reference to the record are deemed adinilloil' In
his memorandum in opposition to Ivory North's motion for summary judgment, Fennell clearly
failed to controvert, specifically 01 otherwise (lie maleti il f;n Is sel Inilh in !< m

Ninlli

statement of undisputed facts. In fact, when questioned directly b> the trial court regarding his
.. - •••

'•

, mav Have been Jelicient.

See R.l 705 at 43.
\ . ', .-iNv> aiiiucs on appeal e.ue; ne complin v\ ,M. a - nile a", it existed at the time of
briefing and arguments.

I he basis for Fennel's argument is that the t

applied ,.ic \oveniber 2001, amendments to the iule. However examination o\ die rule a^ ?!
existed in October 2001, shows tlIO n 11 e • 1111 11 • 111111 n I I vi n 11 11 I 111 [ n1111 111e h 111 \ N u1111 s
statement of undisputed facts.
Fennel linalls argues on appeal (Ii,il i \

I lu diili I \ iiipL \ Ih nile il was improper

for the trial court to grant summary judgment because the adverse party is entitled to have the
• • > . ..

= a ei K
I IK HI t and all" reasonable inferences. , .

however, the record shows that the

trial court did not rely solely on Fennell's failure to comply wiih Rule 4-501(2)(B), Rules of

Judicial Administration, when granting Ivory North's motion for summary judgment. Rather,
the record clearly shows that the trial court determined that summary judgment was appropriate,
as a matter of law, because the pleadings filed and matters presented did not create genuine
issues as to any material facts.
Given the foregoing, upon examining the trial court's order granting summary judgment,
the trial court did not err in applying the governing law and the trial court correctly held that
there were no disputed issues of material fact. Thus, the trial court's entry of summary judgment
in favor of Ivory North was appropriate and should be upheld.
In addition to the foregoing, Utah law clearly allows that the Appellate Court may affirm
a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to the trial court, even if it is one not
relied upon by the trial court. Otsuka Electronics (USA, Inc., v. Imaging Specialists, Inc., 937
P.2d 1274, 1277 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
The Utah Supreme Court has conclusively determined that a cause of action for breach of
implied warranty of habitability does not extend to the purchasers of residential property.
American Towers Owners Assh, Inc. v. CCIMech, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1193 (Utah 1996).
The main policy reason behind extending an implied warranty of
habitability to residential leases are the unequal bargaining position
of the parties and the prospective tenant's limited ability to inspect
and repair the property. These policy reasons are not present to the
same degree in the purchase of residential property. The purchaser
has the right to inspect the house before purchase as thoroughly as
that individual desires, and to condition purchase of the house
upon a satisfactory inspection report. Further, if there are
particular concerns about a home, the parties can contract for an
express written warranty from the seller. Finally, if there a
12

material latent defects of which the seller was aware, the buyer
may have a cause of action in fraud. Therefore, the circumstances
presented ic the purchaser of a residence are not closely analogous
to those oi a relatively powerless lessee
Maakv. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d a* ^X" -:S'

;

•-

Supreme Court later upheld the reasoning in Maak, stating that "[t]he terms of a contract for the

and seller have similar bargaining power. If the seller refuses to accede to an express warranty,
ill : thing pi evei its the bi i> ei ft om halting negotiations and looking elsewl ( uc," American Towers,
930 P.2d at 1193-94.
Additional * .in. keai v.state Purchase Contract between T\w\ North and pLfntiff
explicitly excludes any implied warranties

!'h ' •^itnu

»•

EXCL — iN OF OTHER WARRANTIES. Except for the
IVORY HOME WARRANTY and SELLER'S obligation to repair
or replace WALK-THROUGH ITEMS" (a) SELLER conveys the
PROPERTY to BUYER, "AS IS, WHERE IS," WITHOUT
REPRESENTATION OR WARRANTY, EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED, INCLUDING WARRANTIES OF
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
PURPOSE, HABITABILITY OR WORKM 4NSHIP
added).
I he I Jtah Supreme *, ^urt has upheld "as is" provisions in real estate contracts and found that they
properly exclude breach of implied warranty claims. In 7Ibbitts v. ()n- ;
425 P.2d 160 (1967). the Utah Supreme Court held, in regard !»• the \ endees' counterclaim for
bri'.i.

»*• '•• '

'

•

.- i

provision in

the contracts justified the court's refusal to submit to a jury requested instructions upon breach of

implied warranties. The court initially found that the vendees had not filed the breach of
warranty claim within a reasonable time, but also indicated that the contract provision, which
stated that the vendees accepted the property in its present condition without representations,
covenants or agreements between the parties, was controlling. The Utah Supreme Court referred
to the Utah Commercial Code and stated that although it was not in effect for the subject
contract, the reasoning by analogy was appropriate. The Court quoted Section 70A-2-316(3)(a)
which states that "unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied warranties are
excluded by expressions like 'as is,' 'with all faults' or other language which in common
understanding calls the buyer's attention to the exclusion of warranties and makes it plain that
there is no implied warranty." The Utah Supreme Court found that based upon the above
reasoning there was no error in the trial court's refusing to submit to the jury a requested
instruction on the breach of implied warranty.
Likewise in the subject matter, the Real Estate Purchase Contract contains even more
explicit exclusionary language. The Real Estate Purchase Contract states that not only does
Ivory North convey the property to Plaintiff, "as is, where is, without representation or warranty,
express or implied," but that Ivory North also explicitly excludes all warranties other than the
Ivory Homes Express Warranty, including "warranties of merchantability, fitness for a particular
purpose, habitability or workmanship." Therefore, even if Utah did recognize a cause of action
for implied warranty of habitability in the purchase of a residential home, the contract between
Plaintiff and Ivory North conclusively excludes the warranty from this matter.
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Di
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P R O P E R T Y BEING T H E SITE O F P O T E N T I 41 1 LANDSLIDES
One party to a business transaction is under a duty to exercise reasonable care to disclose
iransaction is consummated, matters known in him that the othei I*
entitled to know'. . . . First Sec. Bankv.Banberry

Dev. Corp., .-s^ M
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(emphasis added).
In his Complaint I ;e:t n lell allege :i that h / : i y ] loi tl 11 lad a cii ity t : • I "et n ie.ll to disclose that
Lot 31 was the site of landslides and erosion. Fhis presumes, of course, that Ivory North knew
!

'

-• ' ; s \ icu :ut \\ a., and Green, not Ivory

North, developed, subdivided, and improved Lot * 1 of the Falcon Ridge subdivision. It is
equall)/ i indisputed that VV all & Green never prm ^.ku fvory North with a copy of Glenn R.
Maughan's geological report and that Wall & Green never iniuis ^
problems existed with . * . •

NV- P l ^05 at 92, 93. Finally, it is undisputed that Ivory North

was never told aboui up v problems wiui i
licenses. Id. at 55.
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Based on the foregoing, the trial court properly concluded that Ivory North did not have a
duty to Fennell because Ivory North did not have any knowledge of any alleged geological
condition on the subject property and summary judgment in favor of Ivory North was warranted.
III.

THE APPELLATE COURT SHOULD DENY FENNEL'S APPEAL BECAUSE IT
DOES NOT COMPLY WITH RULE 24, UTAH RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE
Rule 24, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, specifically requires Fennell to provide a

statement of the issues presented for review. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5). Additionally, Rule 24(e)
states that "[reference shall be made to the pages of the original record as paginated pursuant to '
Rule 11(b) or to pages of any statement of the evidence or proceedings or agreed statement
prepared pursuant to Rule 11(f) pt 11(g)." Id. Finally, Rule 24(j) states that briefs which are not
incompliance may be disregarded or stricken, on motion or sua sponte by the court, and the court
may assess attorney fees against the offending lawyer. Id.
In his brief, Fennell did not set forth a coherent statement of the issues on appeal or
properly cite to the record. Utah's appellate courts have on many occasions "voiced their
frustration with briefs which fail to comply with Rule 24" and "have routinely refused to
consider arguments which do not include a statement of the facts properly supported by citations
to the record." State v. Price, 827 P.2d 247, 249 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d
612, 13 (Utah 1987) (appeal dismissed because the appellant did not support the facts set forth in
his brief with citations to the record as required by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure);
Koulis v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 746 P.2d 1182, 84 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (where a party
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CONCLUSION
• •

agoing reasons, l\or> ,\>>;ii. nunc:-, iliis ' our. ;<• deny Fennell's appeal and

affirm the trial court entry of summary judgment in its favor.
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